Visualising Surfaces, Surfacing Vision: Introduction by Coleman, Rebecca & Oakley-Brown, Liz
	 1	
Visualising	surfaces,	surfacing	vision:	Introduction		
Special	Section	of	Theory,	Culture	and	Society	
	
Rebecca	Coleman	(Sociology,	Goldsmiths,	University	of	London	and	Liz	Oakley-
Brown	(English	and	Creative	Writing,	Lancaster	University)	
	
Abstract	
In	this	Introduction	to	a	special	section	on	Visualising	Surfaces,	Surfacing	Vision,	we	
argue	that	to	conceive	vision	in	the	contemporary	world	it	is	necessary	to	examine	
its	embedding	within,	expression	via	and	organisation	on	the	surface.	First,	we	
review	recent	social	and	cultural	theories	to	demonstrate	how	and	why	an	attention	
to	surfaces	is	salient	today.	Second,	we	consider	how	vision	may	be	understood	in	
terms	of	surfaces,	discussing	the	emergence	of	the	term	‘surface’,	and	its	
transhistorical	relationship	with	vision.	Third,	we	introduce	the	contributions	to	the	
special	section,	which	cover	written	articles	and	artworks.	We	make	connections	
between	them,	including	their	exploration	of	reflexivity	and	recursion,	observation,	
objectivity	and	agency,	ontology	and	epistemology,	relationality,	process,	and	two-	
and	three-dimensionality.	Fourth,	we	consider	some	implications	of	an	
understanding	of	visualising	surfaces/surfacing	vision.	
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In	1988	Donna	Haraway	critiqued	the	elision	between	vision	and	objectivity	in	the	
God’s	eye	trick;	the	view	from	nowhere	that	is	able	to	see	everywhere	and	
anywhere.	In	a	now	infamous	formulation,	she	insisted	instead	on	‘the	embodied	
nature	of	all	vision	and	so	reclaim[ed]	the	sensory	system	that	has	been	used	to	
signify	a	leap	out	of	the	marked	body	and	into	a	conquering	gaze	from	nowhere’	
(1988:	581).	Put	simply,	she	argued,	feminist	objectivity	means	‘situated	knowledges’	
where	vision	is	located	in	specific	bodies,	technologies	and	contexts	(1988:	581).	
Haraway’s	argument	can	be	understood	as	part	of	social	and	cultural	theory’s	wider	
interest	in	vision	and	visual	representation	in	the	1980s	and	1990s	(see	e.g.	Brennan	
	 2	
and	Jay	1996,	Jenks	1995,	Mirzoeff	1998),	an	important	aspect	of	which	is	that	vision	
is	not	neutral	but	is	historically	and	culturally	specific;	it	is	constituted	and	located	
through	its	relations	with	bodies	and	technologies	(see	e.g.	Crary	1990,	Beer	1996).		
	
A	decade	earlier,	Hannah	Arendt’s	interrogation	of	‘the	old	metaphysical	dichotomy	
of	(true)	Being	and	(mere)	Appearance’	and	‘the	old	prejudice	of	‘Being’s	supremacy	
over	appearance’	posited	(after	Adolf	Portmann)	‘the	value	of	the	surface’	(1978:	
27).	This	special	section	both	draws	on	and	pushes	Haraway’s	argument,	paying	
particular	attention	to	the	relationships	between	vision’s	complex	sensorium	and	
‘the	value	of	the	surface’.	The	critical	and	creative	contributions	to	this	special	
section	indicate	that	–	in	different	ways	and	with	different	foci	–	to	understand	
vision	in	the	contemporary	world	it	is	necessary	to	examine	its	embedding	within,	
expression	via	and	organisation	on	the	surface.	What	we	are	suggesting	is	a	review	
of	surfaces	and	a	concomitant	re-evaluation	of	vision	to	understand	it	in	terms	of	a	
surface.		
	
An	attention	to	the	relationship	between	vision	and	surface	can	be	identified	in	
social	and	cultural	theory’s	visual	turn.	Jonathan	Crary,	for	example,	argues:	
	
what	determines	vision	at	any	given	historical	moment	is	not	some	deep	
structure,	economic	base,	or	world	view,	but	rather	the	functioning	of	a	
collective	assemblage	of	disparate	parts	on	a	single	social	surface.	It	may	
even	be	necessary	to	consider	the	observer	as	a	distribution	of	events	
located	in	many	different	places	(Crary	1990:	6).	
	
If	vision	is	composite,	that	is	in	Crary’s	view,	if	it	works	‘as	a	‘collective	assemblage	of	
disparate	parts’,	vision’s	corresponding	focal	point	is	coolly	flattened	into	‘a	single	
social	surface’.	Thus,	one	of	our	aims	is	to	pay	specific	attention	to	this	plane;	
another	is	to	consider	the	political	significance	of	surfaces.	
	
This	Introduction’s	title	‘Visualising	surfaces,	surfacing	vision’	has	a	twofold	meaning.	
It	refers	both	to	how	surfaces	become	a	means	by	which	particular	ideas,	relations,	
	 3	
aspirations	may	be	visualised	and	materialised,	and	to	how	surfaces	may	themselves	
visualise,	that	is	be	a	spatio-temporal	site	through	which	relations	and	materialities	
become	visible,	or	not.	One	of	these	processes	may	be	apparent	in	any	example	or	
case,	or	they	may	both	be	evident.	Surfacing	vision	refers	to	how	vision	becomes	
located	within	or	on	a	particular	kind	of	surface	–	that	is,	how	vision	is	relocated	
from	the	view	from	above	to	a	plane,	or	surface.	Such	a	focus	requires	an	
examination	of,	as	well	as	a	questioning	of,	a	straightforward	hierarchical	binary	
opposition	between	surface	and	vision.	What	are	the	implications	of	positing	a	
‘single’	surface	for	understanding	vision?	To	what	extent	is	a	surface	mapped,	
engaged,	interacted	with,	made	visible?	Does	a	surface	‘belong’	to	any	particular	
entities,	human	or	non-human?	How	is	vision	(part	of	or	constitutive	of)	an	
assembled	surface?	We	approach	these	questions	through	academic	papers	and	art	
works,	seeing	language	alone	as	incapable	of	articulating	their	complexity	and	
drawing	attention	to	the	multiple	practices	through	which	they	are	being	addressed.	
Reading	the	articles	alongside	the	artworks	makes	connections	between	seemingly	
exceptional	and	quotidian	encounters.	Yet	there	are	similar	questions	at	stake:	for	
instance,	how	does	vision	work	to	materialise	or	obscure	particular	material	entities,	
and	what	kinds	of	sensory,	embodied	and	political	experiences	are	created	through	
encounters	with	the	surface?	In	sum,	we	suggest	that	vision	is	productive	of	and	
produced	via	surfaces.	Vision	is	located	‘on’	or	‘in’	surfaces.	At	the	same	time,	vision	
draws	attention	to	surfaces	in	ways	which	ultimately	complicate	Crary’s	concept	of	a	
‘single	social	surface’.	‘The	surface’	is	thus	potentially	manifold	and	politically	
contingent.	
	
As	well	as	discussing	the	various	contributions	to	the	special	section,	this	
Introduction	sets	out	what	‘a	surfacing	of	vision’	refers	to,	what	it	might	involve,	and	
what	some	of	its	implications	are.	First,	we	discuss	how	and	why	an	attention	to	
surfaces	is	salient	today,	drawing	together	recent	social	and	cultural	theories	where	
surfaces	are	both	explicitly	and	implicitly	addressed.	We	emphasise	especially	the	
processual	and	transformational	quality	of	surfaces	and	hence	we	highlight	how	a	
focus	on	surfaces	is	at	the	same	time	a	focus	on	(its)	surfacing.	Second,	we	consider	
how	vision	may	be	understood	in	terms	of	surfaces,	discussing	the	emergence	of	the	
	 4	
term	‘surface’,	and	its	transhistorical	relationship	with	vision.	At	this	point,	third,	we	
introduce	the	contributions	to	the	special	section,	discussing	how	they	address	the	
question	of	visualising	surfaces	and	surfacing	vision.	We	make	connections	between	
them,	including	their	attention	to	reflexivity	and	recursion,	observation,	objectivity	
and	agency,	relationality,	and	a	re-working	of	the	relationship	between	two-	and	
three-dimensionality.	And	we	also	consider	how	they	put	forward	distinct	theoretical	
approaches	and	empirical	foci	to	show	the	divergences	between	them;	the	special	
section	does	not	propose	a	unified	account	of	visualising	surfaces	and	surfacing	
vision	so	much	as	reflect	on	the	multiple	ways	in	which	these	processes	take	place,	
and	the	different	agencies	and	actors	they	involve.	In	the	last	section	of	the	paper,	
we	draw	out	what	we	see	to	be	some	of	the	implications	of	an	attention	to	
visualising	surfaces/surfacing	vision	in	relation	to	social	and	cultural	theory	more	
widely.	
	
I.	Reviewing	surfaces	
According	to	Christopher	Kelen,	‘seeing	and	(re)theorising	surfaces	between	cultural	
entities	(peoples,	cultures,	languages,	and	any	of	their	characteristics)	is	increasingly	
de	rigeur	for	cultural	criticism.	A	variety	of	synonyms	and	metaphorical	schemata	are	
available	for	the	purpose’	(2007:	50).	Lisa	Adkins	and	Celia	Lury	(2009)	designate	a	
‘turn	to	the	surface’,	which	they	explain	in	part	as	‘a	need	to	redefine	the	relations	
between	ontology	and	epistemology,	and	in	particular	a	problematisation	of	surface-
depth	models	that	is	articulated	in	historical	understandings	of	representation	in	
relation	to,	for	example,	hermeneutics,	translation,	concept	formation,	involvement	
of	publics,	and	so	on’	(2009:	15).	For	Adkins	and	Lury,	a	redefinition	of	the	relations	
between	ontology	and	epistemology	as	part	of	a	turn	to	the	surface	is	necessary	not	
only	to	correct	a	dualism	within	theory	itself,	but	also	to	account	for	how	the	social	is	
‘open,	processual,	non-linear	and	constantly	on	the	move’	(2009:	18).	This	
understanding	sees	the	social	as	in	process	or	becoming.	It	is	in	this	sense	that	our	
focus	here	is	not	only	on	surfaces	but	also	on	surfacing;	or,	better,	that	surfaces	are	
understood	in	terms	of	(a)	surfacing.		
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The	relationship	between	surfaces	and	surfacing,	as	well	as	a	rationale	for	why	these	
are	appropriate	methods	through	which	to	understand	the	social	(for	Adkins	and	
Lury)	and	vision	(for	us),	can	be	helpfully	developed	through	recourse	to	Tim	Ingold’s	
work.	Concentrating	on	the	surface	of	the	earth,	Ingold	explains	the	relationship	
between	surfaces	and	surfacing	as	processual:	‘the	ground	surface	is	not	pre-
existent,	but	undergoes	‘continuous	generation’	(2010:	S125),	and	it	is	thus	
‘perceived	kinaesthetically,	in	movement’	(2010:	S125).	He	also	proposes	that	the	
surface	of	the	earth	is	‘composite	[…]	matted	from	the	interweaving	of	a	miscellany	
of	different	materials,	each	with	its	own	peculiar	properties’	(2010:	S125),	and	as	
such,	‘far	from	comprising	a	featureless	and	perfectly	level	plane,	the	ground	
appears	infinitely	variegated’	(2010:	S125).	While	the	surface	is	a	plane,	it	is	also	
patterned,	textured	and	knotty:	a	conception	that	suggests	that	relations	of	power	
exist	and	are	co-ordinated	(see	also	Coleman	2016).	These	characteristics	of	(a)	
surface	lead	Ingold	to	argue	that	a	surface	is	‘its	surfacing’	(2010:	S126).	As	
kineasthetic,	composite,	infinitely	variated	and	continually	generated,	a	surface	is	
always	in	the	process	of	–	and	is	constituted	through	this	continual	process	–	its	
surfacing:	a	surface	is	its	becoming.		
	
The	publication	of	Joseph	Amato,	Surfaces:	A	History	(2012),	Giuliana	Bruno,	Matters	
of	Aesthetics,	Materiality	and	Media	(2014),	and	Glenn	Adamson	and	Victoria	Kelly	
(eds)	Surface	Tensions:	Surface,	Finish	and	the	Meaning	of	Objects	(2014)	alongside	
symposia	such	as	our	own	Theorising	Surfaces	(2013)	and	Mike	Anusas	and	Cristián	
Simonetti’s	panel	Surfaces:	Contesting	Boundaries	Between	Materials,	Mind	and	
Body	for	the	International	Union	of	Anthropological	and	Ethnological	Sciences	
(2013)1	exemplify	the	scrutiny	of	surfaces’	materiality	in	the	second	decade	of	the	
2000s.	Concentrating	on	surfaces	of	different	scale	and	scope,	including	buildings,	
faces	and	plants,	Amato’s	phenomenologically-inspired	monograph	foregrounds	
human	perception’s	variability.	Surfaces,	for	Amato,	
	
furnish	our	primary	encounters	with	the	outer	and	inner	layers	of	things	–	
their	cover,	epidermis,	membrane,	bark,	rind,	hide,	and	skin.	They	also	
present	us	with	our	first	experiences	of	the	primary	disposition	of	objects,	
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bodies,	and	life	out	there,	beyond	us.	In	other	terms,	humans,	ourselves	a	
body	of	surfaces,	meet	and	interact	with	a	world	dressed	in	surfaces	(2013:	
xv).	
	
Amato’s	human-centric	conceptualisation	of	surfaces	puts	it	in	tension	with	other	
recent	work.	For	example,	the	special	issue	of	Environment	and	Planning	A:	‘What	
are	surfaces?’	provides	key	essays	on	the	subject	as	the	journal’s	guest	editors	Isla	
Forsyth,	Hayden	Lorimer,	Peter	Merriman	and	James	Robinson	answer	their	titular	
question	by	way	of	concepts	of	and	case	studies	on	the	surfaces	of	earth,	bodies	and	
faces	and	commodities,	technologies	and	materials	(2013:	1013).	This	line	of	
argument	allows	them	to	‘rethink	surfaces	as	multiple,	embodied,	and	practised	
material	productions’	(2013:	1015),	corporeality	refigured	by	‘Deleuzian,	
Foucauldian,	and	Leibnizian	conceptualisations	of	interiors	as	pleats	or	enfoldings	of	
an	outside’	(2013:	1016),	and	the	ways	in	which	‘[a]n	array	of	different	
technologies…have	fundamentally	altered	the	way	we	think	about	and	understand	
the	world’	(2013:	1017).		
	
In	one	way,	Forsyth	et	al’s	attention	to	the	‘emergent	field	of	critical,	surficial	
thought’	(2013:	1017)	is	analogous	to	our	objectives	in	this	special	section.	Here,	
surface	refers	to	both	tactile	and	tangible	entities	such	as	skin,	screens,	piecework	
quilts	and	the	Earth,	and	to	more	abstract	and	ephemeral	forms	and	processes	
embedded	in	temporality,	spatiality	and	photology.	As	with	vision,	the	surface	is	
material	and	immaterial,	actual	and	virtual.	A	focus	on	the	surface	therefore	requires	
a	consideration	of	the	boundary	making	and	unmaking	between	such	states,	and	
how	they	might	interface	and/or	become	through	their	relationality.	We	also	want	
to	note	and	frame	what	we	see	as	an	emerging	field	of	thinking	(about)	surfaces.	
However,	by	interlacing	critical	essays	and	creative	pieces,	and	by	broadening	the	
scope	from	geography	to	social	and	cultural	theory	more	generally,	we	also	have	two	
further	aims.	One	is	to	bring	together	some	of	the	wide-ranging	and	interdisciplinary	
ways	in	which	different	surfaces	are	currently	being	theorized,	performed	and	
practiced.	A	second	is	to	foreground	a	particular	‘art	of	inquiry’	in	which	‘the	conduct	
of	thought	goes	along	with,	and	continually	answers	to,	the	flux	and	flows	of	the	
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materials	with	which	we	work.	These	materials	think	us,	as	we	think	through	them’	
(Ingold,	2013:	6).		
	
Branden	Hookway	develops	an	‘art	of	enquiry’	by	focusing	on	interfaces	as	a	border	
between	social	phenomena.	In	his	monograph	Interface	(2014)	he	makes	distinctions	
–	albeit	uneasy	ones	–	between	interface,	surface,	edge	and	adjacency.	‘As	a	
boundary	condition	that	comes	into	being	through	the	active	relation	of	two	or	more	
distinct	entities	or	conditions’,	Hookway	observes,	‘the	interface	may	be	
distinguished	from	the	surface.	The	sur-face,	as	a	facing	above	or	upon	(sur-)	a	given	
thing,	refers	first	of	all	back	to	the	thing	it	surfaces,	rather	than	to	a	relation	
between	two	or	more	things.	A	surface	exists	primarily	as	an	aspect	of	that	which	it	
surfaces’	(2014:	13).	In	an	endeavour	to	confound	the	enduring	opposition	between	
visible	and	impalpable	structures	and	their	referents,	Hookway	is	interested	in	
processes	of	relationality:	
	
An	analysis	beginning	from	the	surface	privileges	the	question	of	what	a	thing	
is	or	what	its	properties	might	be,	while	one	beginning	from	the	interface	
privileges	the	question	of	how	a	relation	may	come	into	being	and	how	it	
may	produce	behaviours	or	actions.	A	surface	presents	form,	while	an	
interface	performs	a	shaping.	(2014:	14)	
	
Whilst	this	special	section	is	concerned	with	the	means	by	which	surfaces	come	into	
view,	it	further	probes	the	binary	between	‘form’	and	‘performance’	and	unsettles	
the	nexus	‘upon,	above	and	between’.	Our	understanding	of	surface	moves	between	
what	Hookway	defines	as	‘surface’	and	‘interface’,	in	that	we	examine	both	what	
may	be	‘sur-faced’	and	the	surface	as	a	surfacing	of	relations	and	sensations.	In	
2008,	Susanne	Küchler	noted	that	‘a	new	kind	of	surface	ontology	which	replaces	the	
opposition	of	inside	and	outside,	invisible	and	visible,	immaterial	and	material	with	a	
complementary	relation	that	thrives	on	transformation	rather	than	distinction’	(116)	
has	become	particularly	significant	with	the	emergence	of	a	‘technological	
materiality’.	‘Wearable	computing,	and	smart	fabrics	in	more	general	terms’,	she	
advocates,	distort	‘the	seams	between	mechanism	and	material’	(2008:	101).	
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Küchler’s	positing	of	a	new	surface	ontology	is	also	proposed	by	other	social	and	
cultural	theorists	who	analyse	the	functioning	of	social	and	cultural	processes	as	
networks,	assemblages	and	planes	of	connections	and	linkages.	For	example,	
developing	the	significance	of	the	concept	of	assemblage	to	actor-network-theory	to	
explain	his	notion	of	‘working	surfaces	on	the	social’	–	and	in	ways	that	echo	Crary	–	
Tony	Bennett	(2007a,	2007b)	suggests	the	social	be	approached	as	‘a	single-levelled	
reality’,	where	‘there	are	no	hidden	depths	or	structures	to	be	fathomed’	(2007a:	
33).	He	goes	on	to	argue	that:	
	
This	commitment	to	the	analysis	of	natural/cultural/social/technical	
networks	and	assemblages	of	actants	as	consisting	only	of	visible	surfaces,	a	
single-planed	set	of	wholly	observable	events,	actions	and	processes	with	no	
hidden,	deep	or	invisible	structures	or	levels,	stands	in	contradistinction	to	
the	dualistic	ontologies	of	the	social	that	still	characterise	those	versions	of	
the	cultural	turn	that	have	most	influenced	the	development	of	cultural	
studies	(2007b:	614).		
	
The	understandings	of	surfaces	and	surfacing	that	we	introduce	here	vary	in	their	
foci	and	approach.	While	for	Bennett,	Adkins	and	Lury,	and	Küchler,	surfaces	enable	
a	thinking	through	of	the	connections	between	what	Bennett	calls	
‘natural/cultural/social/technical	networks	and	assemblages’,	for	Ingold	it	is	more	
phenomenological,	whereby	the	point	is	not	‘to	be	beguiled	by	an	ontology	that	
consigns	the	living	world	to	the	inertia	of	its	objective	representation’	(2010:	S137,	
N.	3)	and	epistemology	is	developed	through	the	tactile	relationship	with	the	
ground.	In	bringing	these	sometimes	disparate	approaches	together,	our	intention	is	
to	draw	attention	to	both	the	increasing	interest	in	surfaces	across	different	
disciplinary	perspectives	and	practices	and	how	these	may	draw	through	and	
challenge	certain	historical	conceptualisations	of	surfaces.	It	is	also	to	highlight	how,	
despite	their	distinctiveness	from	each	other,	certain	common	themes	can	be	
identified.	These	include	a	concern	with	process	and	movement,	and	a	reformulation	
of	ontology	and	epistemology,	depth	and	the	superficial,	movement	and	change	–	
and	the	relations	or	boundaries	between	them.		
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II.	Surfaces	and	vision	
But	what	are	the	implications	of	surface/surfacing	for	understanding	vision?	In	
scrutinizing	the	word	‘surface’	itself,	a	significant	relationship	with	vision	emerges.	
Derived	from	the	fourteenth-century	Middle	French	term	defining	the	‘visible	
outside	part	of	a	body,	outermost	boundary	of	any	material	object’2	the	word	
‘surface’	makes	a	striking	appearance	in	the	English	vernacular	in	Thomas	Bowes’	
1594	published	translation	of	Pierre	de	la	Primaudaye’s	The	second	part	of	the	
French	academie	Wherein,	as	it	were	by	a	naturall	historie	of	the	bodie	and	soule	of	
man,	the	creation,	matter,	composition,	forme,	nature,	profite	and	use	of	all	the	
partes	of	the	frame	of	man	are	handled,	with	the	naturall	causes	of	all	affections,	
vertues	and	vices,	and	chiefly	the	nature,	powers,	workes	and	immortalitie	of	the	
soule	(OED	2013).	In	his	epistle	‘To	the	Christian	Reader’,	Bowes	writes	that	‘Seneca	
the	Philosopher	reporteth…that	the	looking	glasse	was	first	invented	to	this	end,	
that	man	might	use	it	as	a	meane	to	know	himself	the	better	by	(b1r)’.	Bowes	
continues:	
	
In	which	respect	this	Booke	may	most	fitly	be	resembled	to	a	glasse,	as	that	
which	affoordeth	unto	us	both	these	uses	in	farre	more	excellent	maner	then	
can	be	performed	by	any	looking	glasse	how	rare	and	surpassing	soever	it	be.	
For	even	the	best	of	that	kind	doth	represent	unto	our	eyes	only	so	much	of	
the	surface	of	our	own	bodies	as	is	directly	before	it,	but	as	for	the	hinder	
parts	we	take	no	view	of	them	by	a	glasse,	much	lesse	is	it	able	to	give	us	a	
sight	of	the	internall	members	of	our	bodies,	wherby	we	may	attaine	to	any	
profitable	knowledge	of	them.	(b1r;	our	emphasis)	
	
It	would	be	foolish,	of	course,	to	suggest	that	surfaces	were	disregarded	before	
1594.	The	publication	of	the	first	English	translation	of	Euclid’s	The	elements	of	
geometrie	of	the	most	ancient	philosopher	(Henry	Billingsley	1570)	complete	with	its	
three-dimensional	fold-up	diagrams	showing	geometric	shapes,	for	instance,	
indicates	that	this	was	not	the	case.3	However,	Bowes’	quotation	is	noteworthy	for	
‘the	ways	in	which	the	terms	‘surface’’’	‘looking	glasse’	‘and	“‘bodies’’	are	brought	
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into	close	proximity’	(Oakley-Brown	2017).	By	contrast	with	the	brass	or	dark	glass	of	
earlier	mirrors	that	produced	murky	reflections,	in	1507	the	Venetians	discerned	
how	to	manufacture	transparent	glass.	While	‘[i]t	continues	to	be	hotly	debated	
whether	glass	is	a	liquid	or	a	solid’	(Garrison	2015:	viii),	glass-making	was	a	process	
which	Herbert	Grabes	called	the	‘technological	marvel	of	the	age’	(Shuger	1999:	21).		
	
For	the	French	philosopher	Georges	Gusdorf,	such	mirrors	‘gave	rise	to	modern	
reflexive	self-consciousness,	which,	in	turn,	led	to	the	sudden	proliferation	of	
autobiographical	genres’	(cited	in	Shuger	1999:	21).	By	contrast,	Deborah	Shuger	
argues	that	the	sixteenth-century	clear-glass	mirror	does	not	record	a	specular	
moment	of	subjectivity	(1999:	21).	Unlike	its	everyday	modern	equivalent,	the	
reflective	surface	of	the	sixteenth-century	mirror	was	generally	convex.	With	a	
bulging	outer	layer	facilitating	a	greater	field	of	vision,	the	material	fabric	of	Bowes’	
‘looking	glasse’	encourages	the	viewer	to	look	outward	not	inward,	thus	supporting	
Shuger’s	central	thesis	that	‘early	modern	selfhood	was	not	experienced	reflexively	
but,	as	it	were	relationally’	(Shuger	1999:	37);	this	mirror	calls	attention	not	so	much	
to	depth	–	‘the	internall	members	of	our	bodies’	–	but	to	the	relations	that	may	be	
detected	on	and	through	its	surface.	Hence,	‘the	early	modern	mirror	functions	
according	to	an	ontology	of	similitude	rather	than	identity/difference;	it	reflects	
those	whom	one	will	or	can	resemble’	(Shuger	1999:	37)	in	an	interpersonal	and	
interactive	process	of	reflection.	In	Bowes’	case,	the	relations	are	white,	Western,	
elite	and	patriarchal;	his	‘looking	glasse’	is	a	‘technological	marvel’	in	favour	of	but	
not	(yet)	consolidating	‘depth	ontology’	(Miller	2010:	16).	In	the	twenty-first	century,	
The	second	part	of	the	French	academie’s	efforts	to	bring	the	‘looking	glasse’	and	
‘bodies’	into	dialogue	with	selfhood	and	identity	also	helps	to	explain	how	
materiality,	technology,	epistemology	and	ontology,	as	we	discuss	below,	are	bound	
up	with	the	semiotics	and	sensations	of	surfaces:	selfhood,	subjectivity	and	identity	
become	known	and	understood,	and	materiality	comes	to	be	shaped	and	made	
actual,	through	particular	visual	technologies.		
	
Evidently	informed	by	contemporary	discourses,	Bowes’	Elizabethan	episode	and	its	
primary	concern	for	the	early	modern	Christian-humanist	condition	might	seem	far	
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removed	from	contemporary	theory,	culture	and	society.	However,	as	Bruno	Latour	
(2010)	has	observed,	‘we	are	actually	closer	to	the	sixteenth	century	than	to	the	
twentieth,	precisely	because	the	agreement	that	created	the	Bifurcation	[between	
Nature	and	Science]	in	the	first	place	now	lies	in	ruin	and	has	to	be	entirely	
recomposed’	(2010:	480).	Looking	back,	as	Latour	suggests,	may	help	us	to	move	
forward.	Or,	put	more	topologically,	‘[t]hings	that	are	seemingly	distant	[…]	turn	out	
to	be	far	more	promiscuous	and	can	be	shown	to	be	in	far	closer	proximity	than	one	
might	initially	imagine’	(Michael	and	Rosengarten	2012:	104).	Such	topological	
thinking	can	therefore	bring	apparently	disparate	elements	into	correspondence,	
connections	that	bring	into	focus	what	might	be	termed	an	interface	or	a	fold	–	a	
surface	–	rather	than	a	linear	trajectory	from	past	to	present	to	future.	In	a	broadly	
Latourian	sense,	like	their	sixteenth-century	pre-Cartesian	counterparts,	twenty-first	
century	Western	ontologies	are	‘caught	up	in	the	same	story’	(Latour	1993:	1)	of	
considering	the	material	means	by	which	surfaces,	vision,	technologies	and	
materiality	are	enmeshed.	Taking	inspiration	from	the	1594	appearance	of	the	word	
‘surface’	and	its	subjects	as	bound	to	the	new	technologies	of	book	and	glass	
production	in	sixteenth-century	England,	places	emphasis	on	the	relations	between	
surfaces,	materiality	and	(contemporaneous)	technologies	through	which	vision	
operates	(differently).		
	
III.	Visualising	surfaces,	surfacing	vision	
If,	then,	a	focus	on	the	surface	involves	an	understanding	of	a	circuit	of	visual	
technologies	and	materiality,	one	question	that	is	raised	is	whether	or	not	it	is	
possible,	or	desirable,	for	the	human	to	be	placed	as	the	central	orientation	point	
from	which	to	understand	surfaces.	In	addition	to	–	or	indeed	supplanting	–	Amato’s	
exploration	of	how	‘humans	[…]	meet	and	interact	with	a	world	dressed	in	surfaces’,	
what	the	contributions	included	here	demonstrate	is	the	inextricable	links	between	
humans	and	technologies.	It	is	not	so	much	a	case	of	humans	moving	out	into	a	
world	that	is	somehow	‘beyond’	them,	but,	in	Patricia	Ticineto	Clough’s	(2010)	
words,	‘the	body	and	the	machine,	the	virtual	and	the	real,	and	nature	and	
technology	are	inextricably	implicated,	always	already	interlaced’	(2000:	11).		
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Clough	expands	this	configuration	of	nature	and	technology	through	the	example	of	
television,	arguing	that	television	does	not	serve	as	an	‘extension	of	the	human	
body,	[…]	maintaining	the	intentional	knowing	subject	at	its	centre	and	as	its	agency.	
Instead,	television	makes	the	subject	only	one	element	in	a	“network	imagination”	
of	teletechnology’	(2000:	99,	references	omitted).	Clough’s	argument	is	made	via	an	
appreciation	of	how	television	is	an	integral	and	ongoing	aspect	of	contemporary	
network	imaginations;	television	is	thoroughly	embedded	in	the	flow	of	social	life.	
Television	invites	that	gaze.	However,	the	television	screen	understood	as	a	surface	
is	a	nuanced	threshold	for	both	folding	in	and	excluding	its	audience	in	ways	that	
chime	with	this	special	section’s	content.		
	
Furthermore,	while	it	may	have	intensified,	the	functioning	of	vision	and	observation	
in	such	a	distributed	and	assembled	manner	has	not	emerged	with	the	digital;	for	
example,	the	mirror	that	Bowes	discusses	is	agentic	in	its	relationality	with	other	
aspects	of	a	vision	and	observing	assemblage.	Modernity’s	‘immersion	in	the	
primacy	of	surface’	(Cheng	2011:	10)	is	illustrated	by	Siegfried	Kracauer’s	practical,	
empirical	and	theoretical	essays	produced	in	1920’s	Weimar	Germany.	In	‘The	Mass	
Object’	(1927),	Kracauer	observes:	
	 	
The	position	that	an	epoch	occupies	in	the	historical	process	can	be	
determined	more	strikingly	from	an	analysis	of	its	inconspicuous	surface-level	
expressions	than	from	that	epoch’s	judgements	about	itself.	Since	these	
judgements	are	expressions	of	the	tendencies	of	a	particular	era,	they	do	not	
offer	conclusive	testimony	about	its	overall	constitution.	The	surface-level	
expressions,	however,	by	virtue	of	their	unconscious	nature,	provide	
unmediated	access	to	the	fundamental	substance	of	the	state	of	things	(75).	
	
While	his	overarching	interests	in	‘marginal,	quotidian	phenomena’	(Levin	1995:	15)	
and	‘surface-level	expressions’	are	outstanding,	Kracauer’s	understanding	of	their	
‘unconscious	nature’	allowing	‘access	to	the	fundamental	substance	of	the	state	of	
things’	remains	indebted	to	the	hierarchical	relationship	between	surface/depth;	
visibility/invisibility.	More	recently,	and	in	opposition	to	‘ocularcentric	paradigm[s]’	
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(Elsaesser	and	Hagener	2010:	109),	late	twentieth-century	thinkers	such	as	Laura	
Marks	have	examined	the	ways	in	which	‘vision	itself	can	be	tactile’	(Marks	2000:	xi).	
Film	theorist	Vivianne	Sobchack	(1991,	2004)	argues	persuasively	for	an	
understanding	of	vision	as	multi-sensory,	while	others	demonstrate	how	images	are	
felt	(as	well	as	seen)	and	lived	out	sensorially	and	affectively	(see	for	example,	
Coleman	2009,	2012,	Oakley-Brown	2017).	Bruno	draws	attention	to	the	tactility	of	
material	surfaces	onto	which	vision	is	projected,	mediated,	transmitted	and	
transmutated	(2014:	3),	be	that	the	surface	of	a	building	or	the	screen	on	which	a	
film	is	projected	and	viewed.	She	argues	that	the	screen	is	‘a	plane	that	makes	
possible	forms	of	connectivity,	relatedness,	and	exchange.	Such	a	surface,	far	from	
being	superficial,	is	a	sizable	entity:	it	is	a	space	of	real	dimension	and	deep	
transformation.	Conceived	as	such	a	space	of	relations,	the	surface	can	contain	even	
our	most	intimate	projections’	(2014:	8).				
	
Produced	in	the	wake	of	such	optic	and	haptic	theories,	Meredith	Jones’	essay	in	this	
special	section	probes	‘an	underexamined	tension	between	two-	and	three-
dimensional	embodiments.	This	tension	lives,	necessarily,	between	flat	
representations	of	bodies	(images)	and	the	shapes,	sizes,	and	dimensions	that	those	
and	all	bodies	have	in	their	living	forms,	as	and	when	they’re	being	experienced	
within	and	having	capacity	through	three-dimensions’	(2017:	XX).	Jones’	essay	
explores	relations	between	bodies	and	surfaces	through	a	focus	on	labiaplasty,	the	
cosmetic	surgery	procedure	that	deals	with	the	‘complex	and	fraught’	history	of	the	
vulva	(2017:	XX).	She	understands	the	procedure	in	terms	of	the	surface	for	the	ways	
in	which	it	moves	between	two	and	three	dimensionality,	complicating	boundaries	
between	inside	and	outside,	body	and	media.	Jones’	argument	is	that	contemporary	
media	culture	creates	what	she	has	termed	in	previous	work	‘media-bodies’	(see	e.g.	
2008),	where	skin	and	screens,	usually	understood	as	distinct	and	incompatible	
surfaces,	are	increasingly	merging.	She	argues	that	skin	and	screens	can	both	show	
and	communicate,	hide	and	conceal,	and	that	there	is	‘a	theoretical	and	an	everyday	
movement	towards	each	other,	a	coming	together	of,	skins	and	screens’	(2017:	XX).		
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Jones’	wide-ranging	discussion	takes	in	recent	representations	of	vulvas	in	popular	
culture	(including	of	Kim	Kardashian	and	understandings	of	censorship	from	film	
board	members),	how	representations	and	understandings	of	the	vulva	have	a	
racialised	and	racist	history,	and	extracts	from	empirical	research	with	women	who	
undergo	cosmetic	surgery.	Drawing	on	these	examples,	she	argues	that	labiaplasty	is	
‘intricately	connected	with	a	growing	conflation	of	skin	and	screen,	where	the	
surface	of	the	skin	becomes	more	expressive	and	visual’	(2017:	XX);	for	example,	
bodies	become	increasingly	part	of	a	media(ted)	gaze,	and	the	gaze	comes	to	
(literally)	shape	bodies.	As	Marina,	a	participant	in	Jones’	research	about	to	undergo	
cosmetic	surgery	says,	‘I	wish	we	could	just	do	Photoshop	to	me	now’	(2017:	XX).	
Jones	attends	clearly	to	the	gendered	and	raced	politics	of	labiaplasty;	but	she	also	
cautions	against	it	becoming	the	subject	of	a	moral	panic,	tied	especially	to	any	
collapse	of	the	surface	into	the	superficial	(read,	feminine:	shallow,	silly,	artificial,	
oppressed).	Instead,	in	ways	that	resonate	with	our	earlier	discussion	of	the	
emergence	of	the	mirror	as	a	surface,	she	proposes	labiaplasty	and	cosmetic	surgery	
more	widely	as	‘allow[ing]	for	potential	new	forms	of	subjectivity	to	emerge:	
subjectivities	that	offer	alternatives	to	Cartesian	depth/surface	binaries	and	offer	
new	ways	of	being’	(2017:	XX).	Marina’s	comments,	for	example,	can	be	seen	as	‘a	
wish	to	exist	in	two-and	three-dimensions,	to	be	able	to	operate	on	more	than	one	
plane’	(2017:	XX).	
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Figure	1:	Sarah	Casey,	‘Dark	Nets’,	2015.	
	
Moving	between	two-	and	three-dimensions	is	also	key	for	Sarah	Casey’s	artistic	
contribution	to	this	special	section	(e.g.	Figure	1).		As	part	of	her	collaborative	AHRC-
funded	project	‘Dark	Matters:	Interrogating	Thresholds	of	Imperceptibility’,	Casey’s	
drawings	are	informed	by	‘theoretical	cosmology,	fine	art	and	anthropology	of	
science	to	explore	the	relationship	between	human	knowledge	and	perception	and	
the	realm	of	the	imperceptible’	(Ellis	and	Casey	n.d.).4	In	acts	of	drawing,	as	John	
Berger	explains,	‘[a]	line,	an	area	of	tone,	is	not	really	important	because	it	records	
what	you	have	seen,	but	because	of	what	it	will	lead	you	on	to	see’	(Berger	in	
Grønstadt	et	al	2016:	9).	Drawing	is	thus	a	particular	‘gestural	form	of	seeing’	
(Grønstadt	et	al	9):	hand	and	vision	work	in	tandem	at	the	surface	of	inscription.	
Arguably	an	anthropographical	exercise,	that	is	a	‘correspond[ence]	with	the	world	
through	drawing’	(Ingold	2013:	129),	Casey’s	work	interrogates	the	representation	of	
ontological	limits	and	the	thresholds	between	what	is	perceptible	and	imperceptible	
through	exploring	how	drawing	works	on	and	with	particular	surfaces.	Recalling	
‘Irigaray’s	analysis	of	the	erasure	of	sexual	difference	as	the	founding	gesture	of	
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metaphysics	in	an	undoing	of	photology	that	can	be	described	as	an	engagement	in	
the	texture	of	light	rather	than	in	relation	to	light’s	value	as	either	an	ideal	physical	
medium	originating	metaphorically	or	naturally	from	the	sun’	(Vasseleu	1998:	11),	
Casey’s	creative	exploration	of	‘invisible	dark	matter’	exploits	photologic	
epistemologies	alongside	superficial	effects:	‘light	itself	appears	layered,	coated,	and	
textured’	(Bruno	2014:	74).	In	one	piece,	for	example,	(Figure	1),	Casey	drew	the	fine	
nylon	mesh	‘cages’	used	to	house	sandflies	in	biomedical	research,	as	a	means	of	
exploring	the	sense	of	barriers	and	limits.	Using	dark	blue	ink	on	dense	dark	indigo	
paper,	Casey	expected	a	‘barely	perceptible	result’	(Casey	2015).	However,	
‘surprisingly,	the	blue	ink	emerges	as	a	coppery	reflection.	[…]	the	ink	on	indigo	
paper	drawing	is	contingent	upon	lighting	and	the	viewer’s	spatial	relationship	to	
the	drawing	in	order	to	be	seen’	(Casey	2015).	In	Casey’s	work,	as	Day	and	Lury	put	
it,		‘relations	of	observation	are	constantly	shifting,	implying	and	sometimes	
precluding	points	of	view,	and	shaping	the	contours	of	events	by	providing	ever-
changing	conditions	for	visibility	and	invisibility	across	situations’	(Day	and	Lury	
2017:	XX).		
	
Of	importance	here	then	are	the	circuits	or	systems	by	which	bodies,	machines,	
vision,	observation	and	reflexivity	plug	into	or	are	in	relations	with	each	other.	On	
this	point,	and	of	relevance	to	a	focus	on	surfaces,	is	the	argument	made	widely	
across	different	theoretical	movements	–	including	ANT	(for	example,	Latour	1993),	
new	materialisms	(for	example,	Barad	2007),	affect	theory	(for	example,	Clough	with	
Halley	2007,	Blackman	and	Venn	2010,	Gregg	and	Seigworth	2010)	–	that	a	network	
or	system	is	composed	of	many	different	types	or	kinds	of	entity,	all	of	which	may	be	
agentic.	Agency	here	is	not	the	preserve	of	the	human,	but	is	distributed	across	
different	actors	that	may	more	usually	be	understood	as	active	and	inactive.	It	is	
necessary	to	examine	both	the	actors	themselves	and	the	connections	between	
them,	reconfiguring	hierarchies	(between	organic	and	technological,	human	and	
nonhuman	for	example)	into	what	might	be	a	single	levelled	and	textured	surface	on	
which	different	entities	are	capable	of	acting.	In	terms	of	Crary’s	conceptualisation	
of	vision,	the	‘single	social	surface’	via	which	vision	functions	is	an	‘assemblage	of	
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different	parts’;	both	vision	and	that	which	observes	is	disparate	and	distributed	–	
and	may	be	composed	of	human	and	non-human	elements.		
	
Rather	than	perceiving	vision	as	a	God’s	eye	trick,	Day	and	Lury’s	essay	draw	on	
Flusser’s	(2014)	philosophy	of	photography	to	propose	an	understanding	of	vision	as	
always-already	within	the	situation	that	is	imaged;	that	is,	the	observer	–	which	
might	be	the	photographed,	the	photographer,	the	viewer	or	the	observational	tool	
–	is	not	outside	the	photograph	but	inside	the	situation	of	photography.	As	such,	and	
in	ways	that	make	connections	with	Haraway’s	and	Crary’s	arguments	noted	above,	
observation	is	immanent	to	the	situation	rather	than	transcendent	of	it,	and	vision	
may	move	and	be	positioned	differently,	constituting	different	visions	as	it	is	located	
differently.	In	Day	and	Lury’s	contribution,	vision	and	surfaces	are	thought	together	
as	a	means	of	understanding	things	that	disappear	from	view	in	a	context	where	
composite	images	from	satellite	data	‘might	lead	us	to	imagine	that	contemporary	
visualisation	has	no	limits’	(Day	and	Lury	2017:	XX).		
	
It	is	to	understand	this	potential	moving	and	changing	quality	of	vision	that	Day	and	
Lury	concentrate	on	the	surface,	which	they	pose	as	‘highlight[ing]	the	ways	in	which	
relations	of	observation	are	constantly	shifting,	implying	and	sometimes	precluding	
points	of	view,	and	shaping	the	contours	of	events	by	providing	ever-changing	
conditions	for	visibility	and	invisibility	across	situations’	(2017:	XX).	The	cases	of	
disappearance	they	examine	are	those	of	Malaysia	Airlines	Flight	370,	which	
disappeared	over	the	South	China	Sea	on	8th	March	2014	prompting	international	
search	efforts	and	struggles	over	what	satellite	images	different	countries	were	
willing	to	share	with	each	other,	and	the	276	girls	who	went	missing	after	their	
abduction	from	Chibok,	Nigeria	by	Boko	Haram.	Through	these	two	distinctive	
examples,	Day	and	Lury	ask	how	planes	and	(specific	kinds	of)	people	can	disappear	
from	‘today’s	apparently	boundless	surface	of	visualisation’	(2017:	XX),	drawing	
attention	to	how	this	surface	is	not	as	smooth	or	all-encompassing	as	it	might	
appear.	Instead,	they	focus	on	recursion	and	rendition	as	two	particularly	significant	
functions	of	contemporary	surfaces	of	visualisation,	which	demonstrate	how	‘the	
grounds	of	observation	may	only	retrospectively	be	established,	and	even	then	only	
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temporarily’	(2017:	XX),	and	how	‘relations	of	observation	are	both	formal	and	
constitutive	of	events’	(2017:	XX).		
	
	
	
	
Figures	2	and	3:	Karen	Shepherdson,	Band	Apart,	2012.	
	
Day	and	Lury’s	interests	in	visibility	and	invisibility	chime	with	Karen	Shepherdson’s	
practice-based	research	which	is	underpinned	by	a	concern	for	visioning	surfaces	
‘created	by	our	perceptual	apparatus’	(2013).	Shepherdson’s	artwork	Band	Apart	
(2012,	Figures	2,	3)	is	a	multimedia	installation	comprising	two	pieces	–	the	three-
dimensional	‘Landscape	with	Unified	Forms’	and	the	two-dimensional	‘Landscape	
with	Fragmented	Forms’.	As	she	walked	around	her	local	landscape	of	the	Isle	of	
Thanet,	Kent,	UK,	Shepherdson	used	mobile	phone	technology	to	photograph	in	situ	
one	thousand	rubber	bands	discarded	by	postal	workers	during	their	rounds.	Each	
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photograph	fashioned	‘its	own	space	around	each	band,	framed	by	different	
surfaces,	textures	and	juxtaposed	objects’.	These	images	were	then	‘randomly	
located	by	a	computer	program,	to	a	contained	space	within	a	3810mm	by	1120mm	
frame’	(2013).	In	so	doing,	Shepherdson	explored	how	this	arbitrary	
‘reappropriation’	altered	the	prosaic	and	mundane	nature	of	the	materials	and	how	
‘surface,	form	and	colour	coalesce	as	viewing	distance	from	the	work	increases’	
(2013).	Next,	Shepherdson	fashioned	the	same	one	thousand	rubber	bands	into	a	
ball	and	set	the	object	within	a	transparent	resin	container.	As	Shepherdson	
explains,	these	‘two	interconnected	works,…[open]	up	new	research,	making	explicit	
connections	between	photographic	images,	surface,	texture	and	three-dimensional	
installations’.	Invested	in	capturing	the	simultaneous	forming/performance	of	
surface,	Shepherdson’s	Band	Apart	presses	Hookway’s	view	that	‘[a]	surface	
presents	form,	while	an	interface	performs	a	shaping’	(2014:	14).	
	
	
	
Figure	4:	Anais	Moisy,	Jen	Southern,	Chris	Speed	and	Chris	Barker,	Unruly	Pitch,	2015.	
	
	
Jen	Southern’s	artistic	contribution	also	shows	how	movement	and	lines	move	
across	different	planes/surfaces,	for	example,	from	walking	on	the	earth	to	stiches	
on	different	fabrics.	Combining	bodies,	movement	and	technology,	she	primarily	
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‘works	with	hybrid	places	as	lived	environments’	(Southern,	n.d.)	Like	Shepherdson,	
Southern	is	interested	in	the	forming	and	reforming	of	surfaces.	But	whereas	Band	
Apart	uses	mobile	phone	technology	to	isolate	and	immobilise	materials	and	
surfaces,	Southern’s	technique	of	‘live	mapping’	
	
offers	participants…a	shared	experience	of	‘comobility’,	of	being	mobile	with	
others	at	a	distance.	As	smart	phones	allow	GPS	to	be	a	networked	
technology	this	form	of	mobile	communication	becomes	possible,	and	[…]	
participants	reflect	on	what	it	means	to	them	to	be	connected	at	a	distance	
through	their	movements,	location,	speed,	trajectory	and	mode	of	travel	
(Southern	2013).	
	
By	contrast	with	Shepherdson’s	interest	in	recording	surfaces-in-suspension,	
Southern’s	‘shared	experience	of	“comobility”’	emphasises	movement	and	real-time	
documentation.		Southern’s	focus	on	mobility	and	mapping	resonates	with	Day	and	
Lury’s	identification	of	the	changing	and	live	modes	of	contemporary	satellite	data	
visualisations,	as	well	as	with	whether	and	how	particular	bodies’	movements	may	
and	may	not	be	tracked	across	surfaces	of	visualisation.	Moreover,	Southern’s	work	
explicates	the	relations	between	vision	and	surfaces	through	the	selection	of	specific	
surfaces	to	work	with.	The	video	that	constitutes	part	of	this	special	section,	Unruly	
Pitch	by	Anais	Moisy,	Chris	Speed,	Chris	Barker	and	Jen	Southern	was	created	for	an	
exhibition	at	the	National	Football	Museum	in	2015	(Figure	4).	In	this	work	GPS	
tracks	of	the	collective	movements	of	players	in	a	mass	football	game,	usually	seen	
as	individual	trajectories	on	a	static	map,	are	traced	onto	a	white	screen,	revealing	
footage	of	the	mass	of	male	bodies	in	a	scrum.	The	mapping	of	GPS	co-ordinates	
onto	the	flat	screen	show	the	temporal	and	visceral	intensities	and	actions	of	the	
game.	At	the	same	time,	the	video	holds	a	tension	between	the	surface	of	the	screen	
and	a	line	that	seems	to	wipe	away	this	surface,	revealing	the	movement	‘below’.	
	
Addressing	the	issue	identified	by	Bennett	of	the	‘dualistic	ontologies	of	the	social’	
that	still	permeate	social	and	cultural	theory	from	a	different	although	
complementary	angle,	Susanne	Küchler	discusses	the	means	by	which	Oceanic	
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piecework	quilts	‘deflect	the	Western	eye	unaccustomed	to	representations	
motivated	by	topological	calculation’	(Küchler	2017:	XX).	Küchler	argues	that	
piecework	quilts	from	the	Cook	Islands,	Eastern	Polynesia,	where	‘composite	parts	
[…]	are	repeated	over	the	surface	in	a	symmetrical,	iteratively	replicated	and	
transitively	arranged	pattern’	(2017:	XX)	are	fundamentally	topological	and	non-
representational,	concerned	not	so	much	with	interpretation	but	with	the	
arrangements	of	parts	across	a	surface	and	the	relations	they	compose.	These	
textiles	form	an	important	and	distinctive	case	of	thinking	through	the	relations	
between	surface	and	vision/visualisation	in	themselves.	She	offers	the	Oceanic	
pieceworks	as	potentially	productive	in	this	regard:	‘That	the	surfaces	discussed	in	
this	article	are	at	home	in	societies	in	which	information	exchange	has	operated	
across	vast	distances	for	some	time	should	make	us	look	at	our	own	[Western]	
preconceptions,	and	provoke	a	rethinking	of	how	surfaces	bind	an	inner,	profoundly	
imagistic	and	geometric	world	of	action	with	an	intentional	relation	to	the	world’	
(2017:	XX).	What	is	highlighted	in	Küchler’s	essay,	then,	is	how	a	concern	with	
topological	surfaces	is	not	new,	and	how	geopolitical	shifts	–	in	the	form	of	disaporic	
movements	across	the	globe	and	in	how	Western	culture	is	‘becoming	topological’	
(Lury	et	al	2012)	–	influence	and	shape	‘visualising	surfaces,	surfacing	vision’.		
	
IV.	Reviewing	surfaces	now	
The	six	contributions	to	this	special	section	are	bound	by	shared	interests	in	
objectivity,	depth,	movement,	relationality	and	composition,	and	individually	and	
collectively,	these	essays	and	artworks	both	illustrate	and	complicate	Crary’s	
assertion	that	‘what	determines	vision	at	any	given	historical	moment	is	not	some	
deep	structure,	economic	base,	or	world	view,	but	rather	the	functioning	of	a	
collective	assemblage	of	disparate	parts	on	a	single	social	surface’.	The	implications	
of	such	a	project	open	out	to	a	series	of	issues	and	trends	in	social	and	cultural	
theory	that	we	have	begun	to	indicate	here.	Thus,	we	locate	a	rationale	for	a	special	
section	on	vision	and	surfaces	within	broader	interest	in	surface/surfacing.	In	
particular,	and	in	part	emerging	through	a	series	of	theoretical	(re-)investments	in	
materiality,	ontology,	relationality	and	topology,	and	in	part	responding	to	
contemporary	social	and	cultural	changes	initiated	by	technological	systems	and	
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mediations,	we	suggest	that	surfaces	are	important	devices	for	exploring	and	
understanding	how	vision	functions	today.	Challenging	the	notion	that	has	
permeated	Western	thought	that	surfaces	are	things	to	be	delved	under	and	got	
beneath,	our	argument	is	that	surfaces	should	themselves	be	seen	as	sites	of	
interest:	as	interfaces	where	spaces	and	times	–	virtual	and	actual	–	might	be	
brought	together	for	example,	or	intersections	where	different	senses	or	
materialities	–	human	and	nonhuman	–	might	rub	up	against	one	another,	or	
boundaries	where	certain	limits	may	be	made,	or	breached.	As	this	Introduction	has	
suggested,	a	focus	on	surfaces	draws	attention	to	the	points	where	potentially	
different	entities	both	meet	and	are	made	distinct.		
	
More	specifically,	we	argue	that	understanding	vision	and	visualising	in	terms	of	a	
surface	draws	attention	to	how	traditional	dichotomies	–	between	the	organic	and	
technological,	real	and	representational,	interior	and	exterior	–	themselves	require	
re-working	or	are	being	re-worked,	as	surfaces	may	operate	not	only	or	so	much	as	a	
dividing	line	as	a	fold:	‘pleats’	of	matter,	the	continuous	textured	and	fluid	enfolding	
and	unfolding	of	relations	between	bodies,	technologies	and	worlds	(Deleuze	2003).	
As	we	hope	we	have	begun	to	show,	while	the	individual	contributions	are	informed	
by	different	conceptual	models,	the	special	section	suggests	more	generally	that	the	
study	of	surfaces	is	rhizomatic;	it	is	an	inherently	interconnected	and	
interdisciplinary	network	with	no	firm	foundation	or	clear	centre	(Deleuze	and	
Guattari	1987).	In	this	way,	our	identification	of	the	significance	of	surfaces/surfacing	
to	understanding	vision	today	resonates	with	Martin	Jay’s	comments	on	the	pictorial	
turn	in	the	1990s;	‘a	heterotopic	space	without	a	single	totalizing	vantage	point.	The	
‘pictorial	turn’,	like	the	‘linguistic	turn’	before	it,	shows	itself	to	be	richly	varied	and	
irreducible	to	one	model’	(1996:	9).	By	contrast	to	the	continued	oscillations	of	the	
dialectical	exchange	between	subjects	and	objects,	inside	and	outside,	nature	and	
culture	then,	we	suggest	that	an	attention	to	surfaces	encourages	alternative	
configurations	of	the	technological	and	material	conditions	through	which	culture	
and	society	transforms,	and	of	the	ways	in	which	social	and	cultural	theory	may	fold	
into	such	transformations.	In	bringing	the	different	approaches	proposed	by	these	
original	articles	and	artist	videos	into	dialogue,	the	aim	of	the	special	section	is	to	
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begin	to	co-ordinate	what	we	see	as	some	of	the	key	conceptual	framings	of	this	
emerging	field	of	a	turn	to	a	surfacing	of	vision.		
	
Indeed,	responding	to	the	‘paradigm	shift’	that	Jay	identifies	in	the	1990s	through	a	
recognition	of	the	proliferation	of	images	in	contemporary	culture	and	the	
displacement/replacement	of	a	primarily	linguistic	model	of	understanding	social	life	
with	a	visual	one,	what	we	are	suggesting	with	this	special	section	is	that	there	may	
be	a	further	shift	underway.	What	it	examines	is	how	surfaces	are	a	productive	way	
in	which	to	understand	the	emergence	of	new	and	apparently	boundless	modes	of	
visualisation,	how	a	concern	with	surfaces	may	be	understood	topologically	and	
relationally,	the	techniques	through	which	vision	becomes	visible,	or	not,	and	the	
fusion	between	skin,	screen	and	image.	We	suggest,	therefore,	that	a	contemporary	
concern	with	vision	must	take	into	account	the	specific	techniques,	conventions	and	
practices	via	which	vision	and	materiality	are	co-produced	through	
surfaces/surfacing.	We	see	such	a	project	as	necessarily	concerned	with	politics	and	
ethics:	it	draws	attention	to	how	images	are	produced,	viewed	and	engaged	(with),	
how	actors	or	agencies	are	entangled	and	‘cut’	(Barad	2007),	and	the	effects	and	
affects	of	location,	vision	and/or	observing	technologies.	
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1	Theorising	Surfaces:	An	Interdisciplinary	Seminar,	24th	May	2013	and	Surfaces	in	
the	Making	Art	Exhibition,	23rd	May-1st	June	2013,	The	Storey	Creative	Industries	
Centre,	Lancaster,	UK:	see	http://www.surfacestudies.org/events.html	and	
‘Surfaces:	Contesting	Boundaries	Between	Materials,	Mind	and	Body’,	6th	August	
2013,	Manchester,	UK:	see	
http://www.nomadit.co.uk/iuaes/iuaes2013/panels.php5?PanelID=1662	.	See	also	
Mike	Anusas	and	Cris	Simonetti	(eds),	Surfaces:	Transformations	of	the	Body,	
Materials	and	Earth	(forthcoming	2018).	At	the	former	events,	Celia	Lury,	Sarah	
Casey	and	Jen	Southern	were	among	those	who	presented	work;	in	the	latter,	
Susanne	Küchler	participated.	
2	We	were	reminded	of	the	general	OED	definition	in	Forsyth	et	el	(2013:	1015).	For	
an	extended	discussion	of	premodern	surfaces	see	the	special	issue	of	the	Journal	of	
the	Northern	Renaissance	edited	by	Liz	Oakley-Brown	and	Kevin	Killeen	on	
Scrutinizing	Surfaces	in	Early	Modern	Thought	(2017).	
3	See	Kathleen	Crowther,	Euclid	and	Book	History	in	the	Digital	Age	
http://www.math.ubc.ca/~cass/Euclid/dee/dee.html>date	accessed	1	September	
2016	
4	See	http://darkmattersproject.wixsite.com/thresholds	.	In	her	earlier	Murmur	
works	(2009-11),	Casey	considers	the	interplay	between	light,	matter	and	drawing	
with	a	view	to	capturing	the	ways	in	which	medical	technologies	reveal	intimate	and	
otherwise	inaccessible	fabric	of	the	human	body.	See	further	
http://www.axisweb.org/p/sarahcasey/	.	
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